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It is undisputed that the policy in this State requires a court to both discover and 
make effective the intentions of a decedent with respect to the distribution of his or her 
own property. However, in an effort to avoid the consequences resulting from his 
estrangement from his father,1 Tom urges this Court to disregard such a policy and to 
instead hold that Ira's clearly stated intentions and desires regarding the distribution of 
his property are "irrelevant" and "immaterial" given his failure to strictly comply with the 
provisions of his Trust, as interpreted by this Court. Such an argument must be rejected 
pursuant to the controlling law in this case. 
1. BANKS SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO THIS CASE 
Despite the many factual differences between the present case and Banks v. 
Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190, including the fact that Ira amended the governing 
language of his Trust, Tom essentially argues that this Court should blindly apply the 
holding of Banks to this case purportedly because Ira intended the language of paragraph 
3.2 of the Trust (before he amended it) to limit his ability to amend or partially revoke the 
Trust by creating "Vested beneficiary interests that could be divested only through a 
In his Brief, Tom claims that Jeffs recitation of the facts, including a description of 
Ira's letter detailing the many conflicts Ira had with Tom, is merely slinging mud in an 
attempt to "make himself appear more sympathetic." (Br. of Appellee at 2 n.l.) This 
statement is simply an extension of Tom's philosophy throughout this proceeding, in 
which Tom seeks to minimize and/or dismiss Ira's motivations and intentions for 
disinheriting him as "irrelevant" or "immaterial." Such a philosophy should not be 
countenanced by this Court, however, in light of the clear directive of the Utah 
Legislature to "discover" and "make effective" Ira's intent. Ira's issues against Tom are 
very relevant to his intent to disinherit Tom, as clearly evidenced by Ira's letter, and such 
information should properly be considered by the Court. 
1 
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complete revocation of the trust.'" (Br. of Appellee at 10 (quoting Banks, 2002 UT 65 at 
U 14).) However, such an argument ignores the reality, already recognized by this Court, 
regarding the origins of the language found in paragraph 3.2. 
As recognized by Tom, within just five years after the issuance of Banks, this 
Court was required to revisit its holding in Banks in two separate cases. See In re Estate 
of Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589; Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, 169 P.3d 750. 
However, contrary to Tom's assertions, this Court did not embrace the reasoning of 
Banks in its subsequent opinions. To the contrary, the Court actually recognized that the 
language interpreted in Banks was confusing, contradictory, and, in fact, the result of an 
"antiquated and now widely discredited rule." Hoggan, 2007 UT 78 at f 11 n.2. 
For example, in Flake, issued less than one year after the Banks opinion, the 
plaintiff, Mrs. Flake, sought to invalidate a "restatement" of her husband's trust, which 
had the effect of reducing substantially her interest in the trust property. 2003 UT 17 at f^ 
6. The original trust, which was executed by Mr. Flake in 1987, contained a provision 
substantially similar to that of paragraph 3.2 of Ira's Trust. Id. at f^ 17. That provision 
provided that "[t]he interest of the beneficiaries is a present vested interest which shall 
continue until the [fjrust is revoked or terminated other than by death."2 Id. Although the 
1988 "restatement" of the trust was not a complete revocation of the 1987 trust, this 
Court nonetheless ultimately held that the 1988 restatement was valid because it merely 
In comparison, Ira's Trust, prior to the Partial Revocation, provided that "[t]he interests 
of the beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject to divestment which shall 
continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death." (R. 334 
(emphasis added).) Thus, the only difference between the Ira and Flake trust provisions 
is the additional explanation "subject to divestment" found in Ira's Trust. 
2 
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amended but did not completely divest Mrs. Flake of her interest in the trust property.3 
Id. However, in so holding, the Court expressly recognized that the "purpose and 
primary effect" of the language regarding the beneficiaries' "vested interest" was "to save 
the [t]rust from the doctrine of merger and to prove that the [t]rust is not illusory." Id. 
Four years later, the Court further distanced itself from the language found in 
paragraph 3.2 of Ira's Trust when it issued Hoggan. In Hoggan, the Court did not 
overrule Banks but instead affirmed the validity of an amendment to Ms. Hoggan's trust 
based upon its clarification in Flake, where the Court held valid an amendment that 
merely changes "'the quality, or scope'" of a beneficiary's interest. 2007 UT 78 at ^ 11, 
12 (quoting Flake, 2003 UT 17 at f 17.). Although the Court did not affirmatively 
disavow or overrule Banks, it must be noted that the Court did "disavow the use of this 
phrase [Vested interest subject to divestment']," declaring as follows: 
Language asserting that beneficiaries have a "present interest" or a 
"presently vested interest" in a trust has apparently become common within 
trusts drafted in Utah. We suspect that drafters include such language with 
the intent of warding off potential challenges to the trust on grounds that it 
is illusory. See Banks, 2002 UT 65, ffl[ 12-13, 52 P.3d 1190. 
Unfortunately, such phrases have been the focus of recent litigation and 
Because the Banks opinion defined a vested interest as "something c[t]hat has become a 
completed, consummated right for present or future enjoyment; not contingent; 
unconditional; absolute....,'" 2002 UT 65 at % 12 n.3 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 
1557 (7th ed. 1999), it is unclear why a vested interest may be reduced, as in Flake, but 
not completely revoked, as in Banks. Indeed, if the trust language regarding "vested 
interest" is to be given literal interpretation, it would seem that a settlor would be 
prevented from both eliminating and reducing a beneficiary's interest in trust property. 
See, e.g., Alexander v. Brigham & Women's Physicians Org., Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d 136, 
141-42 (D. Mass. 2006) (noting that, under ERISA, "generally contributions to an 
individual's pension plan Vest' at a particular time and thus become 'unforfeitable.' 




have the potential to produce results not within the contemplation of the 
drafters of trusts or their clients. Indeed, the potential for confusion is 
great because in many living trusts, like the one at issue here, the 
beneficiaries have no immediate right of possession or enjoyment of the 
trust property. In such instances, the insertion of language proclaiming 
that the beneficiaries have a "present interest99 simply contradicts the 
operative terms of the trust.... Similarly, trusts in which the settlor retains 
the right to amend or revoke the instrument do not convey "presently vested 
rights" to beneficiaries because their interests are contingent upon the 
settlor not amending or revoking the trust.... 
The impetus for including such phrases within trust agreements appears to 
originate, unfortunately, from our holding that a trust is invalid unless the 
beneficiary's interest vests during the settlor's lifetime.... In an apparent 
effort to uphold prior precedent while at the same time avoiding the 
invalidation of countless trusts intended to serve as substitutes for wills, we 
later said that such trusts created vested interests that were subject to 
divestment. Although the term "vested interest subject to divestment" is 
more of an oxymoron than a meaningful legal term, over the decades this 
phrase has been used by this court to uphold trusts in which the 
beneficiaries' interests were not vested under the traditional meaning of the 
term. 
We hereby disavow the use of this phrase and the antiquated and now 
widely discredited rule ... that gave rise to it. We agree with the analysis 
of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which advocates the abandonment of 
such confusing and disingenuous terminology in favor of an open 
recognition that there is no requirement that a beneficiary's interest be 
either present or vested.... 
Id. at % 11 n.2 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
Despite this Court's recognition that the language of paragraph 3.2 of Ira's Trust 
"has the potential to produce results not within the contemplation of the drafters of trusts 
or their clients," "contradicts the operative terms of the trust," and is "confusing and 
disingenuous terminology," id., Tom nonetheless urges this Court to exactingly apply that 
language in this case to save Tom from the consequences of his failed relationship with 
4 
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his father.4 To do so would be erroneous and unjust. Indeed, because Ira specifically 
revoked the language of paragraph 3.2 and replaced it with language consistent with his 
intent and the operative terms of his Trust, the district court erred in invalidating the 
Partial Revocation based solely upon outdated language that has been "disavowed]" by 
this Court. Given that the "confusing and disingenuous terminology" of paragraph 3.2 
serves no useful purpose, this Court should hold that the district court erred in 
disregarding Ira's stated intentions and his revisions to the governing provisions of his 
Trust. See In re Johnsons Estate, 228 P. 748, 749 (Utah 1924) ("The intention of the 
testator is the ultimate object to be kept in mind and to which all rules must yield and is 
the polar star which should guide the court in its decision." (internal quotations and 
citations omitted).) 
2. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY 
SECTION 75-7-605 
There is no question that Section 75-7-605 applies to the determination of whether 
a partial revocation, such as the one executed by Ira, is sufficient to revoke or amend a 
trust. Indeed, pursuant to Section 75-7-1103, Section 75-7-605 applies to all trusts 
created before, on, or after July 1, 2004, and to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts 
commenced on or after July 1, 2004. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1103(l)(a), (b) (2009). 
Thus, it cannot be challenged that the law that should have been applied in the 
4
 Although Tom also claims that Ira's Partial Revocation was a result of lack of 
competence or undue influence, (Br. of Appellee at 13), Tom has presented no evidence 
to support such a claim. Rather, as shown by his motion for summary judgment, Tom 
seeks to avoid the issue of Ira's intent altogether by arguing that the Partial Revocation 
did not strictly comply with Banks. 
5 
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proceedings below is the standard of substantial compliance set forth in Section 75-7-
605. 
There is also no question that the district court's application of Banks in the 
proceedings below is inconsistent with Section 75-7-605. Indeed, although Tom argues 
in his brief that "[t]here is no inconsistency between the statute and Banks" he also 
recognizes that "[a]t most, the statute allows the settlor to substantially comply with the 
terms of the trust, while Banks requires the settlor to strictly comply with those terms." 
(Br. of Appellee at 24.) Because there is a fundamental difference between strict 
compliance and substantial compliance, it cannot be disputed that Section 75-7-605 
supersedes Banks.5 
Apparently recognizing that Section 75-7-605 should have been applied instead of 
Banks, Tom seeks to excuse the district court's error in failing to apply the controlling 
law by arguing that (1) Ira did not substantially comply with the terms of his Trust 
because he merely amended, but did not revoke, the Trust; and (2) Jeff failed to raise 
Section 75-7-605 to the district court. However, as discussed below, the record 
establishes that, at the very least, there is a factual question as to whether Ira substantially 
complied, thus rendering summary judgment improper in this case. Moreover, the record 
also establishes that Jeff raised the controlling law to the district court's attention prior to 
any ruling, thereby allowing the district court the opportunity to correct any error before 
5
 The only argument advanced by Tom as to why Section 75-7-605 should not be held to 
supersede Banks is that this Court did not discuss the statute in its opinion in Hoggan. 
However, a review of the appellate briefs filed in the Hoggan case establishes that 
Section 75-7-605 was never raised to this Court's attention. 
6 
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issuing its judgment. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's judgment 
for failure to apply the proper test set forth in Section 75-7-605. 
a. The District Court Erred in Failing to Determine whether Ira 
Substantially Complied with the Terms of his Trust 
In an attempt to avoid application of Section 75-7-605, Tom argues that Ira's 
Partial Revocation was not, in fact, a revocation and therefore could not have 
substantially complied with the terms of the Trust governing divestment of a 
beneficiary's interest.6 In so arguing, Tom relies on a definition of "revoke" discussed in 
In re Estate of Stern, 636 N.E.2d 939, 942 (111. App. Ct. 1994). However, as recognized 
by Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000), another case cited by Tom, the term 
"revoke" is not limited to the strict definition promoted by Tom. Indeed, in Johnson, 
while the majority of the United States Supreme Court described the ordinary meaning of 
revoke as "to annul by recalling or taking back," it actually embraced an alternate 
definition of "revoke" in its resolution of the case. Id. at 704, 706 (internal quotations 
omitted). Specifically, the Court held that Congress' use of the word "revoke" in the 
statute at issue was consistent with "calling back, suspending, or abrogating, either finally 
as erroneous or ill-advised or tentatively for deliberation." Id. at 706 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
While it could be argued that either definition of "revoke" applies to this case, 
such an argument is unnecessary because it is clear that Ira's Partial Revocation satisfies 
Although Tom claims that Jeff has engaged in a "semantic game of distinguishing 
between" an amendment and a revocation, the substance of Tom's argument 
demonstrates that it is Tom, not Jeff, who is playing with semantics, arguing that Ira's 
Partial Revocation should not be considered a revocation. 
7 
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both definitions. Ira clearly "recalled," "t[ook] back," and "abrogated]" the interests of 
each of the Trust's beneficiaries by revoking paragraph 3.2. Indeed, prior to executing 
the Partial Revocation, paragraph 3.2 granted the beneficiaries only "presently vested 
interests subject to divestment." (R. 334.) Ira then took back or abrogated the present 
vestment by revoking paragraph 3.2 in its entirety and replacing it with a provision which 
provided that "[a]ny interest of any Beneficiary in any assets of the Trust or in income or 
principal related to any asset of the Trust is under the sole and absolute control of the 
Trustees until the Trustees actually distribute said interest to the Beneficiary." (R. 362.) 
Ira did not merely amend his Trust; he revoked all presently vested interests (which, 
according to Hoggan, had not actually presently vested) of the beneficiaries. 
Tom also argues that reversal is not required despite the district court's failure to 
apply the controlling law because this Court may hold that Ira did not meet the standard 
of substantial compliance required by Section 75-7-605. However, in so arguing, Tom 
fails to recognize that the question of whether substantial compliance has been achieved, 
as opposed to whether the doctrine of substantial compliance applies in the first place, is 
o 
a question of fact to be determined by the fact finder. See Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 
*7 
As recognized in Section 75-7-606, it was wholly within Ira's power to revoke the 
beneficiaries' interests. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-606(1) (2009) ("While a trust is 
revocable and the settlor has capacity to revoke the trust, rights of the beneficiaries are 
subject to the control of, and the duties of the trustee are owed exclusively to, the 
settlor."). 
8
 Although Tom cites Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998), for the proposition 
that the question of whether the Partial Revocation substantially complied is a "question 
of law" to be reviewed "for correctness," (Br. of Appellee at 23 n.10), it should be noted 
that the only issue addressed in Geisdorf was whether the doctrine of strict compliance, 
as opposed to substantial compliance, applied. 972 P.2d at 70 ("The initial question we 
8 
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contract, including, the question of substantial performance, "constitute issues of fact for 
the fact finder"). 
Relying on Reliance 1 nsurance Co v I ' k ih Depai tment q I 2 t anspot h ition. 858 
P.2d 1363 (I Jtali 1/993), ' I 'oi :i i ai gi les that Ira' s Partial Revocation camiot be considered to 
have substantially complied because Ira's performance "was flawed far beyond technical 
^r unimportant -„\ ah- s. . - \ppeikx ,.i 1:-.) \\\< *e\er. :• vu. JvCb not, nor can he,, 
s'r • :->\ . t-- . \ ( 1 1 1 1 1 g 1 1 1 n i v Ih , in11 , i |ii 'n• 1111inii;,1111) ' 11in \11; i ' i i | mi11 111 ,111 
of'this Court's recognition that the "confusing and disingenuous" language of paragraph 
3.2 should be "disavowed]" because it was a result of an "antiquated and now widelj 
disci edited i i lie " F fogg < in, 200 1 1 J I / '8 at % 11 i I 2 tl le it e is sh iipl) nc • ii e 
Ira or any other settlor to continue to jump through the hoops set forth in paragraph 3.2 to 
fulfill a rule that no longer has any purpose or justification. 
Moreo\ ei , • i ,u^i : -.).. 
essentially an oxymoron because "beneficiaries have no immediate right of possession or 
address is one of 'substantial' compliance versus 'strict' compliance. Specifically, we 
-, >\ decide whether it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury that Geisdorf was 
onl\ inquired u substantial 1:. ^mpl-. with the Renewal Clause."). Geisdorf did not 
addrev* wo) did ;t provide, a standau. • •<'•.! \ r»i determining the factual issui of 
whether ^ubsianual performance had. in fact, been accomplished. However, that J^UC 
• is addressed in Saunders v. Sharp. 793 P 2d 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), which held thai 
..
 t .|!:osijr» ^f'vhether sub^uiria' — y^^ h -MV IV1- been achieved is a que^r^ <>* i ** 
tu i it : '" :> i , 
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enjoyment of the trust property," id., provides further support that Ira substantially 
complied, in light of the well-recognized rule that 
[ejxtremely important factors in solving the present problem [of what is 
substantial performance] are the character of the performance that the 
plaintiff promised to render, the purposes and end that it was expected to 
serve in behalf of the defendant, and the extent to which the 
nonperformance by the plaintiff has defeated those purposes and ends, or 
would defeat them if the errors and omissions are corrected. 
Corbin on Contracts, 3-A, Section 706, cited in JM. Beeson Co. v. Sartori, 553 So. 2d 
180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); see also Joseph A. v. New Mexico Dept. of Human 
Servs,, 69 F.3d 1081, 1085, 1086 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that the determination of 
whether substantial compliance has been achieved requires the court to consider whether 
"the deviation from the ... requirements [would] ... in any real substantial measure ... 
frustrate[] the purpose" of the contract (third and fourth alteration in original)). 
Because the language of paragraph 3.2 could not grant Tom a "presently vested 
interest" in the assets of the Trust, Ira's failure to completely revoke the Trust did not 
frustrate any purpose of the Trust or any right or interest of Tom. Thus, the undisputed 
evidence establishes that Ira did substantially comply with the terms of his Trust by 
executing the Partial Revocation. At the very least, a question of fact exists that is 
improper to resolve on a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, this Court should 
reverse the district court's judgment and remand for a determination of whether Ira's 
Partial Revocation satisfied the substantial compliance standard set forth in Section 75-7-
605. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3). 
10 
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AlhM mend 
Recognizing thai lie would not be entitled f. '-, bment "as a matter of law" if the 
should disregard the applicability of Section 75-7-605 because Jeff w aived anj - argument 
regarding application of the statute. However, Tom's argument is erroneous V 
discussed in Badge! \ ', Br < wklyn Q inal Q > , 966 I '".2d 8 1 1 (I Jtah 1998), an issi le is 
ill Ilit ilisliiul u mill iiiiull IIUMI'IOII' pivsmnl (on .ippi .il when the district court is "offered 
an opportunity to rule on [tl le] issue." L / at 847 The district court is offered the 
opportunity to rule if (1) tl i.e issue was raised "in a timely fashion' ; (2) tl le issue was 
introduced. Id. 
Tom does not argue that Section 75-7-605 was not "speaiu\n a^cu not ones 
he argue that Jeff failed to j: i ese nt ' i ele * ant le gal an itl 101 it) " "": •* • . 
Section 75-7-605 was not iiiiici> raised because Jeff did not address it in his written 
memorandum .^posing Tom\ motion for suninun judgment. However, such an 
argument .. n • ,a|. >poi ted b) , and ii I fact, is cc viriti ai ;; to tl lis G :>i in: It s disci issi :: i 1 of 
timeliness in Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
1983) . In Franklin, this Court did not hold, as Torn n*..\ UWH > that an issue is un t imely 
r a i s u . ana m u e i o r e waived .; r, , > not addressed in tl: .. : . - , 
I •' . - i :^ / i \ahle that an a rgument 
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may be "raised orally" at a hearing before the district court.9 Id. at 1045. It is only when 
an issue "was not presented to the trial court prior to the ruling" that the "argument [is] 
made too late." Id. (emphasis added). 
This Court's holding that an issue must be raised prior to a ruling from the district 
court is in complete harmony with the policy reasons behind the preservation rule. As 
stated in State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, 46 P.3d 230, 
The two policy reasons for the preservation rule are, first, to give the trial 
court an opportunity to address the claimed error, and if appropriate, correct 
it, and second, that a [party] should not be permitted to forego making an 
objection with the strategy of enhancing] the ... chances of [victory] and 
then, if that strategy fails, ... claiming] on appeal that the Court should 
reverse. 
Id. at Tf 10 (second, fifth, and sixth alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
9
 See also Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987) 
("Although it is conceivable that these arguments were raised orally in the hearing on the 
motion for summary judgment, there is nothing in the record to support that possibility, 
and there is no such contention in plaintiffs' briefs."); Badger, 966 P.2d at 848 (holding 
that, due to the fact that the transcript was "devoid of any mention" of the issue claimed 
by plaintiffs to be raised orally at the hearing, "the hearing transcript reflects that the ... 
plaintiffs failed to raise their ... claims during the hearing."). 
Tom attempts to distinguish Franklin and In re Estate of Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), by stating that both cases "merely noted there was no record of 
whether the arguments were raised at the trial court hearings." (Br. of Appellee at 17.) 
However, the mere fact that both this Court and the Court of Appeals undertook a review 
of the record in both cases (as well as in Busch and Badger) to determine whether the 
issues were raised orally at the hearings before the district courts (or administrative 
agency) clearly contradicts Tom's claim that an issue not raised in a written 
memorandum is waived. Indeed, if Tom's claim were valid, all that would have been 
necessary in Franklin, Badger, Busch, and Morrison to determine whether the issue had 
been raised would have been a review of the written memoranda. Any review of the oral 
argument transcript would have been unnecessary and any discussion of whether the 
parties provided an adequate record to demonstrate that the issue had in fact been raised 
would have been superfluous. 
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Flv misiii; , Sir 1 i<»n 75 7 605 i il ; irgi ime lit on 
Tom's motion for summary judgment, Jeff clearly provided the district court w itli the 
opportunity to avoid error by applying the correct controlling law in this case. Moreover, 
court with a i m m j opportunity to correct its error by moving that lin judgment be 
altered or amended pursuant to Ri lie 59.Il1 
Despite llit lad iltul Ik1 dislnct omul was al'toided an opporluiiilv lo asoid c i HI 
Tom argues that this Court should refuse to apMv Section 75-7-605 in this case because 
lie "had no leal opportunity h respond" •* Vti s assertion ihat the statute applied )- : h 
present dispute >•>, • >, .p ruio. ,. owever, L„n .-. ^ ..*..;. , ; . . ^...w ; . I K ^ -
viewed in 1 did n »1 
court's consideration of Section 75-7-605. nor did he ask for the opportune t. U\c 
supplemental hneis <»h iin j^sue (presumably because it cannot be ^m*e^n:d mai Sreiion 
7 • • ' >../-, A •. . < < • -
opportunity to brief all of the legal and factual arguments relating to the application of 
Tom appears i<> aiuue \\u: Judge Maughan's denial of Jeff s Rule 59 Motion was 
- ithin his discretion However, Judge Maughan was not the judge assigned to this case 
he time of oral ai-annent Rather, Judge Faust was the judge assigned to the case and 
tiie judge who heard the oral argument on Section 75-7-605. Judge Faust did not rule, 
either at the hearing or thereafter, that he would not consider Section 75-7-605 due to the 
fact that it was not raised in the written memoranda. 1 o the contrary, Judge Faust 
declared that he took the matter under advisement "to further consider the parties' written 
submissions, the relevant k\e;:' ' liiority and counsel's oral argument." (R.518.) 
Because Judge Maughan was not privy to the argument presented by counsel, his 
•'"•
%ision to deny Jeffs Rule 59 Motion should be afforded no discretion and should 
...oiead be reviewed "under a correction of error st^ nH m] *' *f.*nn -. 'w.Wr/W^rw, 2006 
UT App 475, U 6, 153 P.3d 768. 
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Section 75-7-605 in his response to Jeffs Rule 59 motion. And, despite such an 
opportunity, Tom fails to identify any reason why Section 75-7-605 should not be applied 
in the present case. 
Moreover, it is important to note that Tom, not Jeff, was the party that sought 
summary judgment "as a matter of law." Indeed, Tom represented to the district court 
that he was entitled to judgment on both his claims and Jeffs counterclaims based upon 
the holding of Banks v. Means. Thus, Tom sought to short-circuit the litigation process 
and to obtain a judgment without a trial, based solely on a case that was subsequently 
discovered to have been superseded by Section 75-7-605. Although Tom claims 
prejudice, it is clear that Tom will not be unjustly harmed if the correct law is applied in 
this case. Rather, the parties will simply be placed in the same position they occupied 
prior to Tom's motion for summary judgment. While there can be no doubt that the 
district court's error favored Tom, Tom was never entitled to the "judgment as a matter of 
law" that he sought and should therefore not be allowed to benefit from the district 
court's error. 
Moreover, even assuming Jeff did not timely raise Section 75-7-605, this Court 
should nonetheless apply the statute to reach the correct result in this case. This Court 
has consistently recognized the importance of applying the correct law. For example, in 
Kaiserman Associates, Inc. v. Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462 (Utah 1998), this Court 
declared, 
In our view, an overlooked or abandoned argument should not compel an 
erroneous result. We should not be forced to ignore the law just because 
the parties have not raised or pursued obvious arguments. This is 
14 
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K^H** u- i ih^r : hnr-iliv1 or n roumem hv the r i r t i e s . 
M at 464; ^ee olw ^ i / i y ;. L//zrV<' &//7 . /;/<-.. 2000 UT \ " •' " r ^ l 528 ('sani^ 
Thurston i > Box Elder County. 8.0 - 4 If D, 1(35 1:1 3 (I ia*
 t992) (holding u.ui, .k^p»k 
case sua sponte because it is controlling and it would be contrary to public policy to 
decline to do so."). " Such a policy of ensuring that the correct law is applied is well 
established and is 'e-^ 
Conduct, which imposes upon opposing counsel the ethical obligation to disclose 
controlling In "directly adxerse to the position * n *)••.: client." Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 
33(a)(2); see CUM? united stau \ . i *•/*.;;. , u . u . --: JI • - I > ' ! . , -. 
F - v/ Mn • ! M annate law must be applied in each case and 
upon a failure :• d*- M) appellate courts should remand the cause to the trial enow to 
aii^iu ii opportunity to ^PH HL appropriak law, even ii t-ii question was not raised in 
tl- - ' N I ( " f\ ii appellate 
11
 Tom argues that the Thut\slori Court "decided -hat public policy aspects of the case 
required considering the statute/* (Br. of Appellee at IS.) However, it appears that the 
only public policy aspect noted by the Court, other than the need to comply with 
legislative intent, was the fact that "it would be < • »ai f.» nuhlir pnh."\ in d<»Hin<*" t<> 
apply the controlling law. M at 168. 
. n\ Thurston, the district courts refusal *.. .;|
 f?I\ h< correct controlling km m 
this case resulted It: *i ftiluie to coniph v. *.)» legislative intent, which provides thai die 
Uniform Prolw- < od. ^..»j'.! :> • "libenlK construed and applied to promote n> 
underlying puiposes and policies, which include "|t]o discover and make effective the 
intent of a decedent in d^HbTio- ^ <- >-->?-<. •• nf.a, r^fj,» Ann § 75-1-102(1). 
(2)(b) (2009). 
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court has inherent authority to consider issues which the parties have not raised if doing 
so is necessary to a proper decision."). 
As in Kaiserman, any question of whether Section 75-7-605 applies to Ira's 
Partial Revocation is "obvious" and can be decided "without briefing or argument by the 
parties." Indeed, the Uniform Trust Code unequivocally provides that its provisions 
apply to "all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2004," as well as "all judicial 
proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2004." Utah Code Ann. § 
75-7-1103(1 )(a), (b) (2009). And, while Tom has briefed the issue both in his response to 
Jeffs Motion to Alter or Amend and in his Brief to his Court, Tom has not identified, nor 
can he identify, any legal basis to support an argument that Section 75-7-605 should not 
apply. Thus, this Court should reverse the district court's ruling and remand with 
instructions that the court apply Section 75-7-605 to determine the validity of Ira's Partial 
Revocation. 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING TOM SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON JEFF'S CLAIM FOR REFORMATION OF THE TRUST 
Again relying solely on language that has been disavowed by this Court, Tom 
argues that the district court did not err in granting to him summary judgment on Jeffs 
counterclaim because the evidence in this case shows that "Ira intended to limit his (and 
Avis') ability to disinherit their children in the future." (Br. of Appellee at 26.) 
However, such an argument elevates "confusing and disingenuous terminology" over the 
unambiguously and unequivocally stated intentions of Ira, as expressed in his Partial 
Revocation. As noted in Section 1, supra, this Court has recognized that the phrase 
16 
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"vested Interest si lbject t : :il ' e stment ' ' I o\ 11 i :i in p ai agi a| >I i 'i '" 1  11.i"''. Il 11 mist ! v as 
originally created as a means to uphold trusts that may otherwise have been determined to 
be illusory. Hoggan, 20CP TTT 78 at % 11 n.2. However, such trust language is 
t j i e t m s ^ » / ^ Tom's reliance on such a phrase as evidence of Ira's intentions is therefore 
misplaced. 
the district court was obligated to do5 Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, f 6, 177 P.3d 600, it 
is apparent that Im did n>i intend ^ lin \ hi* , i l -^o -' 'u-ke or amend his Trust by 
requiring a complete revo iv . j u i a a . , vu < e\pressi\ .n >' -nammguously 
provides that "[a]s long as the I Jndersigned lira' * •! . * -.i ;^: -nrd r ^ — es the 
right to amend, i-iodih oi revoke this Trust in whole or in na (R. 333, paragraph 
3.1 (emphasis added).) Ira explained his undeistanding ol the provisions of his I i i ist in 
his Partial R ei - c> :atic i i. v - he i e he sta I • the ph rase 'i mtil this 
Trust is revoked' found in paragraph 3.2 to mean 'revoeatio ^f this Trus t . . . in whole 
or in part' (paragraph 3 1), rather than, 'revocation of this instrument in its entirety' 
Trust 's creation, Ira did not intend to create a trust that limited his power to revoke or 
modify any terms of the Trust but instead intended to reserve all power to revoke, 
i i lodif; r c i ai i t = i i :i am ' j: i • Dvisioi is c f till i : I it i i s t Becai ise this C : i in: It s i lbsequei ltly 
interpreted sinniai ianrju^ic oi other trusts to limit such pi-^cr, Ira's Trust should be 
reformed to properly reflect Ira's intentions. Specifically, paragraph 3.2 of the Ti ust 
17 
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should be amended to provide that "[t]he interests of the beneficiaries are presently 
vested interests subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked, in 
whole or in part, or terminated other than by death." 
Tom also argues that Ira's intent at the time his Partial Revocation was executed is 
19 
irrelevant and does not properly reflect his intent at the time he executed the Trust. 
However, as recognized by the comments to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 4, the 
intention of the settlor at the time of the Trust's creation may be determined "by 
interpretation of the words or conduct of the settlor in the light of all of the circumstances 
surrounding the creation of the trust" and may be shown "not only by facts that occurred 
before or at that time [of the trust's creation] but also by facts occurring thereafter ...." 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 4 cmt. a. 
Looking at Ira's conduct at the time of the Trust's creation and thereafter, it cannot 
be ignored that paragraph 3.1 of the Trust, at the time it was originally executed by Ira, 
unequivocally reserved "the right to amend, modify or revoke this Trust in whole or in 
part." (R. 333.) Such language, by itself, creates a genuine issue of disputed material 
fact regarding Ira's intent sufficient to preclude summary judgment. And, in addition to 
the language of paragraph 3.1 and Ira's subsequent explanation found in the Partial 
Revocation, it is undisputed that the phrase "presently vested interest subject to 
12
 We note that Section 75-7-415 should also apply to the Partial Revocation to reform 
that document to conform to Ira's stated intentions. Clearly, Ira believed that revoking 
the governing language of his Trust was sufficient to distinguish his case from that of 
Banks. If this Court ultimately determines that Ira was unsuccessful in doing so and that 
the Partial Revocation is invalid, the Partial Revocation should be reformed to be a 




than as an expression of a settlor's intent. Given these facts and all reasonable inferences 
to be drawn therefrom, a disputed issue of material fact exists regarding Ira's intentions. 
As a result, the district court erred in granting sum.rn.ary judgment to I om. 
4. iiiiL DISTRICT COURT ERRED in H U L H ^ U H 
ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF OF IRA'S PERSONAL PROPERTY 
Despite the provision of Ira's will, which expressly provides that it and Ira's Trust 
" Inun purl nl .HI infq»nlni pi, HI l« pirn nli IIIi in liic ili,>po r ; . i |lns| 
death and ... should be construed and administered according "" <P ^ 4 S iom argues 
that -h\>. Court J:oulu ignore the provisions -f r <" ~u;o that transferred all of his 
personal, propertv owner. .... :.* ; .;>; ;. aisl was executed and acquired thereafter, 
because Jell "Uiu not make tiu- .jii-ument before the * t ; -svlhv n *s < 
However, such an argument is erroneous. 
In, h is memorandum in opposition to I om's motion for summary judgment, leH 
conveyed all bank accounts, securities, pension and profit sharing plans, IRAs, and ail 
personal ai id household articles to the Ira Trust at the time the Ira Trust was formed " 
as Exhibit E, clearly states that Ira transferred "[a]n> and all personal, property now 
' Tom represents that his motion for partial summary judgment was filed after the close 
oi discovery. (Br, of Appellee at 6.) However, such a representation is erroneous loin 
'^•\1 his motion on July 1\ 2009. (R.328), approximately two weeks before he was 
,*-.>sed, (R.31 ) . 1 act discovery closed on July 30. 2009, (P ?%> ind Jeff fji-j h = ,. 
•v.r.se iusi i\} r d^vs l.itiM- on AUPUSI ^ ^000 (K 4A1 
4^\u • . . J . : ,\ 
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owned or hereafter acquired*' to the Trust. (R.389 (emphasis added).) Given this 
evidence, the district court erred in concluding that Tom was entitled to one-half of the 
personal property of Ira's estate.14 
CONCLUSION 
Although Tom attempts to avoid the consequences of his failed relationship with 
his father, the Utah Legislature has clearly declared that the policy of this State is to 
effectuate the intent of a decedent with respect to the distribution of his property. 
Because the holding announced in Banks is contrary to the controlling statute applicable 
to this case and is no longer functional given this Court's subsequent disavowal of the 
language at issue in Banks, this Court should hold that Ira's Partial Revocation is valid 
and should be given effect. 
In the alternative, this Court should hold that the district court erred in granting 
Tom summary judgment on Jeffs counterclaim for reformation because Ira's clearly and 
unambiguously expressed intent to reserve all power to amend or revoke his Trust 
presents a disputed issue of fact. Finally, this Court should hold that the district court 
erred in ruling that Tom was entitled to one-half of Ira's estate when such a ruling failed 
to comply with Ira's intent that his will be interpreted in conjunction with his Trust. 
Accordingly, Jeff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
Regardless of whether the district court erred in interpreting Ira's will, the district 
court's ruling that Tom "is entitled to one-half of the personal property included in Ira's 
estate," (R.521), is moot in light of the undisputed fact that no personal property in fact 
belongs to Ira's estate. 
20 
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granting summary judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings before the 
district court. 
DATED this 16th day of August, 2010. 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
^ € n ^ y j , t L J | 
Clark R. Nielsen 
Kathryn J. Steffey 
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